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Introduction
A bank’s capital, in its simplest form, represents 
its ability to withstand losses without becoming 
insolvent. As demonstrated in a number of   
North Atlantic countries during the recent financial 
crisis, bank failures – and fears of bank failure – can 
be highly disruptive to the macroeconomy. National 
regulators therefore promote resilience in the 
banking sector by specifying a minimum amount 
of capital that banks must hold and the form that 
capital should take. The financial crisis has prompted 
a rethink of how strict these requirements should be. 
This article explains how the minimum capital 
requirement currently operates in Australia, discusses 
the Australian banking system’s capital position and 
how it has evolved over the recent crisis period, and 
briefly outlines some of the main regulatory changes 
that are being considered.
1
Capital Regulation in Australia
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
makes and enforces the rules which govern the 
capital adequacy of Australian banks. The current set 
of rules are a conservative application of the latest set 
of international capital standards issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision  (BCBS), which 
*  The authors are from Financial Stability Department.
1  While the same capital requirements also apply to other Authorised 
Deposit-taking Intitutions in Australia, such as credit unions and 
building societies, this article focuses on Australian banks only.
the amount and quality of the Australian banking sector’s capital has increased considerably 
over the past couple of years. As in a number of other countries, this is because the recent global 
financial crisis has prompted both markets and regulators to reappraise their views on acceptable 
levels and forms of capital. national and international regulatory bodies have proposed a number 
of major changes to existing capital regulations, details of which will be finalised later this year.
are collectively termed ‘Basel II’.
2 APRA  introduced 
these standards to Australia in 2008 as an update to 
the first set of Basel standards – ‘Basel I’ – that were 
implemented in 1988. Central to the design of the 
Basel capital standards is the idea that a bank should 
hold capital in relation to its likelihood of incurring 
losses. The standards focus heavily on the definition 
of capital and the measurement of risk.
Measuring capital
An Australian bank’s regulatory capital is the sum 
of its ‘Tier 1’ and ‘Tier 2’ capital, net of all specified 
‘deductions’.
Tier 1 capital consists of the funding sources to 
which a bank can most freely allocate losses without 
triggering bankruptcy. This includes, for example, 
ordinary shares and retained earnings, which make 
up most of the Tier 1 capital held by Australian 
banks (Table 1). It can also include specific types 
of preference shares and convertible securities but, 
since it is more difficult for banks to allocate losses to 
these instruments, APRA currently specifies that no 
more than 25 per cent of Tier 1 capital can be in this 
form. Total net Tier 1 capital of Australian banks as at 
March 2010 was $131 billion.
2 The BCBS’ governing body comprises central bank governors 
and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from its 27 member 
countries, which include Australia and the rest of the G-20.44 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
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Table 1: Australian Banks’ Regulatory Capital(a)
As at end March 2010
$billion per cent of total
Net tier 1  131.0 79.9
   of which:
   Ordinary shares 115.0 70.1
   Retained earnings 52.9 32.2
   Reserves and minority interests –2.4 –1.5
   Tier 1 preference shares 12.8 7.8
   Tier 1 convertible securities 13.0 8.0
   Deductions –60.4 –36.8
Net tier 2  33.0 20.1
   of which:
   Term subordinated debt 35.8 21.8
   Other Tier 2 instruments 7.0 4.3
   Deductions –9.8 –5.9
total capital 164.0 100.0
(a) Locally incorporated banks, consolidated global banking group; all instruments are measured at book value
Source: APRA
Tier 2 capital is made up of funding sources that 
rank below a bank’s depositors and other senior 
creditors, but in many cases are only effective at 
absorbing losses when a bank is being wound up. 
In this way, Tier 2 capital provides depositors with 
an additional layer of loss protection after a bank’s   
Tier  1 capital is exhausted. Tier 2 capital of the 
Australian banking system primarily consists of 
subordinated debt, though it also comes in other 
varieties, such as preference shares. Total net Tier 2 
capital of the Australian banking system as at   
March 2010 was $33 billion.
Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital are measured net of 
deductions, which are adjustments for factors that 
lessen the loss absorption capabilities of capital. For 
example, banks often have equity balancing their 
holdings of intangible assets, like goodwill, which 
can automatically lose value as a result of the threat 
of bankruptcy. That part of a bank’s gross capital 
is therefore unavailable to absorb other incurred 
losses. As at March 2010, there were $70  billion 
of regulatory capital deductions on the books of 
Australian banks. Around $45 billion were generated 
by holdings of intangible assets, most of which were 
in the form of goodwill.
Measuring risk
For capital adequacy purposes, Australian banks 
are required to quantify their credit, market and 
operational risks. The most significant risk of these is 
typically credit risk, reflecting Australian banks’ focus 
on traditional lending activities.
Credit risk is measured as the risk-weighted sum of 
a bank’s individual credit exposures, which gives 
rise to a metric called ‘risk-weighted assets’. Under 
the Standardised approach employed by most of 
the smaller banks, the risk weights are prescribed   
by APRA and are generally based on directly 
observable characteristics of each exposure. For 
example, if a residential mortgage has a loan-to-
valuation ratio of 70 per cent, full documentation   
and no mortgage insurance, APRA specifies a risk 45 Bulletin | September Quarter 2010
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Some banks, including the four largest, use an 
alternative Internal Ratings-based approach whereby 
risk weights are derived from their own estimates of 
each exposure’s probability of default and loss given 
default.
4 APRA grants approval to use this approach 
only after a bank has met strict governance and risk 
modelling criteria.
4  One bank operates under a different Internal Ratings-based approach, 
whereby internal models are used to estimate default probabilities 
but supervisory rules are used to determine each exposure’s loss 
given default.
weight of 35 per cent. If the outstanding balance 
of that mortgage is $100, its corresponding 
risk-weighted asset is $35. Corporate exposure risk 
weights are based on external credit ratings and 
are generally higher than for residential mortgages 
because the exposures are usually riskier.
3
3  Corporate exposures that are unrated are assigned a risk weight of 
100 per cent.
Table 2: Australian Banks’ Risk-weighted Assets(a)
As at end March 2010
exposure
average   
risk-weight risk-weighted assets
$billion Per cent $billion Per cent of total
Credit risk 2 739 43 1 181 85
   of which:
   Corporate 472  78 370 27
   Residential mortgage 1 157  26 302 22
   Other retail(b) 171  80 137 10
   Bank 103 18 18 1
   Sovereign 99 7 7 ½
   Off-balance sheet(c) 560 36 200 14
   Other(d) 177 83 147 11
market risk 63 5
   of which:
   Traded 22 2
   Non-traded (IRRBB) 41 3
Operational risk 102 7
Securitisation(e) 24 2
Other(f) 20 1
total 1 390 100
(a) Locally incorporated banks, consolidated global banking group
(b) Includes exposures to individuals for small business purposes, credit card exposures, and other personal exposures
(c) Excludes risks associated with selling securitised assets; exposure amount is on an on-balance sheet equivalent basis
(d) Includes, for instance, fixed asset investments and margin lending exposures
(e) Charges for risks associated with the buying or selling of asset-backed securities
(f)     Charges that are applied to banks using the Internal Ratings-based approach to credit risk to ensure that there are no 
unintended falls in banking system capital during the transition to Basel II
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These methodologies together give rise to 
$1 200 billion in credit risk-weighted assets at 
Australian banks (Table  2). This compares with 
(unweighted) assets of around $2 700  billion. 
Within the risk-weighted total, corporate   
exposures account for $370 billion, while residential 
mortgage exposures are lower at around $300 billion, 
reflecting their relatively lower risk weights. There are 
also $200 billion in credit risk-weighted assets that 
are generated from off-balance sheet exposures. 
These are predominantly in the form of corporate 
credit commitments, interest rate derivatives, and 
foreign exchange derivatives.
The market and operational risks are also measured 
in terms of risk-weighted assets, though this is more 
of a naming convention than being indicative of 
the underlying measurement process. For instance, 
as part of market risk, APRA requires some banks 
to consider interest rate risk in the banking book 
(IRRBB), which refers to the potential for loss arising 
from timing and size mismatches in the repricing 
of a bank’s funding and lending instruments. 
Measuring this risk requires a holistic approach to 
the bank’s balance sheet rather than the granular 
use of risk weights for each exposure.
5 As at March 
2010, total market and operational risks accounted 
for  5  per  cent and 7  per cent of the Australian 
banking system’s total risk-weighted assets. 
Minimum capital requirements
APRA requires all locally incorporated banks to hold 
total capital of at least 8 per cent of their risk-weighted 
assets. At least half of their total capital must be the 
better-quality Tier 1, implying a minimum Tier 1 
ratio of 4 per cent.
6 APRA can and does also increase 
these minima for individual banks where considered 
necessary on account of their risk profile.
5  It is also worth noting that Australia is the only country in which IRRBB 
is explicitly included in banks’ risk-weighted assets. That said, IRRBB 
is a relatively small risk in Australia because most lending is made is 
at variable rates and interest rate mismatches are usually relatively 
minor. 
6  Foreign banks operating in Australia as branches are not required to 
hold capital in Australia. They are capitalised through their head office, 
offshore.
As at March 2010 the Australian banking system had 
an aggregate total capital ratio of 11.8 per cent and 
an aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio of 9.4 per cent, with 
both ratios having increased significantly over the 
past couple of years (Graph 1).
Recent Developments in Australian 
Banks’ Capital 
The recent global financial crisis has prompted 
much greater focus on banking system capital. 
Notably, large and sudden losses incurred by some 
of the world’s largest banks prompted investors, 
regulators and rating agencies to reappraise the 
prospect of bank losses and appropriate levels of 
capital. In addition, some of the lower-quality forms 
of capital were not as available to absorb losses as 
anticipated, and were subsequently looked upon 
less favourably as a source of financial strength. 
Convertible securities, for example, were included in 
the Basel II definition of Tier 1 capital on the premise 
that banks would exercise their option to convert 
them into common equity whenever additional 
capital was needed. These securities have not been 
as widely used in Australia as in a number of other 
countries, but some domestic and international 
banks have recently opted to raise capital in other 
ways rather than convert, fearing the negative signal 
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Australian banks have responded to the change 
in global attitudes by significantly increasing the 
level and quality of their capital. Changes to the 
growth and composition of their loan portfolios 
have also limited increases in their risk-weighted 
assets. As a result, the Australian banking system’s 
total capital ratio rose by  0.9  percentage  points 
from September 2008 to March 2010 (it rose 
by 1.3  percentage points from March 2008 to 
March  2010, though this figure is  clouded by 
data issues associated with some banks’  delayed   
transition to Basel II and the introduction of the 
IRRBB charge in September  2008). Moreover, the 
system’s Tier 1 capital ratio rose by 1.8 percentage 
points during this time, to its highest level since at 
least the 1980s (when comparable data first became 
available). The sizes of these capital ratio increases 
are similar to the experience of the early 1990s, 
during which Australia had a recession and the 
banking sector also faced strong market pressures to 
improve its capital position.
Holdings of capital
The amount of capital held by the Australian banking 
system rose by $13.7 billion from September 2008 
to March 2010. Within this total, there was a rise in   
Tier 1 capital of $26 billion and a decline in Tier 2 
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Table 3: Change in Australian Banks’ Capital and Risk-weighted Assets(a)
September 2008 to March 2010
$billion per cent
total capital 13.7 9.1
   of which:
   Net Tier 1 26.0 24.8
   Net Tier 2 –12.4 –27.3
risk-weighted assets 16.3 1.2
   of which:
   Credit risk –6.6 –0.6
   Market risk 11.3 21.9
   Operational risk and other 11.7 8.6
(a) Locally incorporated banks, consolidated global banking group
Source: APRA
The rise in the banking system’s Tier 1 capital 
mostly reflects a large amount of new equity 
that was issued in late 2008 and the middle of 
2009 (Graph 2). The major banks issued $30 billion 
during this time, largely through a combination 
of new share issuance and dividend reinvestment 
plans. The regional banks issued a further   
$2.1 billion. In contrast to some of their international 
peers, these issues were at only modest discounts 
to the market price, and were entirely to the private 
sector; there was no injection of public money into 
Australian bank capital. New equity raisings were 48 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
AustRAliAn BAnk CApitAl And the RegulAtoRy fRAmewoRk
the key driver of increases to the Australian banking 
sector’s Tier 1 capital in the early 1990s as well.
Having reported solid profits throughout the turmoil, 
the Australian banking sector was also able to 
generate Tier 1 capital organically, through increases 
in retained earnings. Some banks supported this 
process by making cuts to the overall value of 
dividend payments, which contributed to higher 
retained earnings than would have otherwise been 
the case (Graph 3).
The effect of these initiatives in increasing Tier 1 
capital was somewhat offset by a rise in deductions, 
partly because a number of acquisitions generated 
new goodwill through the purchase price exceeding 
the book value of assets. There was also a $1 billion 
fall in the outstanding amount of Tier 1 convertible 
securities. The financial crisis has highlighted that 
there can be strong disincentives for banks to use 
them as loss absorption tools, so they have become 
less highly regarded as sources of bankruptcy 
protection by markets and regulators. The BCBS has 
signalled that the status of these securities is being 
reviewed in forthcoming revisions to international 
capital standards.
With a number of governments overseas having 
recently demonstrated their willingness to 
shore-up banks’ balance sheets before their Tier 2 
capital takes  losses, markets are also placing less 
emphasis on this form of capital. Most notably, 
the outstanding balance of Australian banks’ term 
subordinated debt has fallen by around $10 billion 
since September 2008, after strong issuance in the 
earlier part of the decade.
Exposures to risk
The Australian banking sector’s total risk-weighted 
assets rose by $16.3 billion, or 1.2 per cent, from 
September 2008 to March 2010. There was a 
$11.3 billion rise in the charge for market risk, with 
the IRRBB charge increasing as a result of rises in 
long-term interest rates from early in 2009 and the 
amortisation of past IRRBB gains. The operational risk 
charge rose by $11.7 billion.
Partly counteracting these rises was a $6.6 billion 
fall in credit risk-weighted assets. One reason for this 
decline is the relatively slow growth in Australian 
banking sector lending over this period, as banks 
tightened their lending standards and businesses 
worked to reduce their leverage.
7 The sector’s total 
domestic credit has grown at an annualised rate 
of 4.5  per  cent since September 2008, compared 
with an average of around 14  per cent over the 
previous five years (Graph 4). There has also been 
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a shift in the composition of banks’ loan portfolios, 
towards housing lending, which typically attracts 
much lower risk weights than business and personal 
lending. The amount of banks’ off-balance sheet 
credit commitments has been falling recently as 
well. The slower growth in credit and the change 
in its composition are similar to the patterns of 
the early 1990s recession, when credit growth of 
the Australian banking sector fell significantly and 
the share of credit devoted to housing increased 
strongly. Credit risk-weighted assets, though 
measured differently at the time, fell by 6.4 per cent 
from December 1990 to December 1993.  
These recent size and compositional changes to 
bank lending have been partly offset by an increase 
in the average risk weight of banks’ business 
exposures. For the major banks, whose credit risk 
weights are derived using internal models, estimates 
of the average probability of default for large 
corporate counterparties increased by around ½ of 
one percentage point to 1½  per cent  (Graph  5). 
Their average probability of default estimates for 
residential mortgages have increased only very 
slightly and remain at a little over 1 per cent. There 
were also some rises in loss given default estimates 
across these categories. 
Forthcoming Regulatory 
Developments
With the financial crisis revealing a number of 
inadequacies in the capital held by banks globally, 
there has been a strong push by national regulators 
to tighten global capital regulations, particularly   
in those countries most affected by the crisis. The   
BCBS has been the main driver of international   
reforms in this area over the past year or so and 
has released a number of consultative documents 
suggesting major changes to its Basel II capital 
standards.
8 There are several proposed key reforms 
(some of which are now closed to consultation and 
have aspects on which broad agreement seems to 
have been reached).
  • Increase the quality, international consistency 
and transparency of the capital base. This 
8   See, in particular, BCBS (2009, 2010a).
includes enhancing a bank’s capacity to absorb 
losses on a going concern basis, such that more 
of its Tier 1 capital is in the form of common 
shares and retained earnings.
  • Strengthen the risk coverage of the capital 
framework, with more capital being required for 
counterparty credit risk exposures arising from 
derivatives and repurchase agreements. This 
would strengthen the resilience of individual 
banks and reduce the risk that shocks might 
be transmitted from one institution to another 
through the derivatives and financing channels.
  • Introduce a non-risk-weighted simple leverage 
ratio requirement as a supplement to the Basel II 
risk-weighted capital adequacy rules. The stated 
advantages of this methodology are that it 
would help contain the build-up of excessive 
leverage in the banking system and introduce 
additional safeguards against attempts to ‘game’ 
the risk-based requirements. 
  • Reduce procyclicality by promoting the build-up 
of capital buffers in good times that can be 
drawn down in periods of stress. Based on one 
of the current proposals, this would work in the 
form of a system-wide capital surcharge that 
national authorities would put into effect when 
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  • Ensure that even if a failed or failing bank is 
rescued through a public-sector capital injection, 
all of its capital instruments are capable of 
absorbing losses. This includes a requirement 
that the contractual terms of capital instruments 
allow them to be written off or converted into 
common equity if a bank is unable to support 
itself in the private market. 
Most of these reforms will inevitably raise the cost 
of intermediation above pre-crisis levels, and it will 
be important to ensure an appropriate balance 
between this cost and the benefit of financial 
systems being subject to stronger standards. In 
order to help policymakers assess this balance, the 
BCBS undertook a detailed quantitative impact study 
of some of these proposed changes during the 
first half of 2010. APRA led Australia’s contribution 
to this work and consulted with Australian banks 
involved in the study. APRA and the Reserve Bank 
also participated in international working groups 
that took a ‘top-down’ look at the capital proposals 
by determining benchmarks against which they   
will be judged, and assessed their likely 
macroeconomic effects.
9
APRA will consider the agreed international 
timetable when implementing the new standards, 
which on the basis of the latest proposals would 
see the first of the new requirements in place from 
the start of 2013, with some longer phase-in periods 
for certain elements of the package. The BCBS 
has committed to issue details of finalised capital 
reforms and transition arrangements later this year. 
APRA will provide further guidance on Australian 
transition arrangements around that time, but 
currently does not expect that banks in Australia will 
need an extensive transition period to meet the new 
capital requirements. Australian banks appear to be   
better placed to meet the new capital criteria 
than banks in a number of other countries, partly 
because APRA’s existing capital rules are based on 
a relatively more conservative application of the   
Basel II standards.
9  See BCBS (2010b) and Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010).
Conclusion
The Australian banking system has significantly 
increased its capital buffer against potential losses in 
recent years. To a large extent this has been driven 
by the financial crisis, which prompted markets, 
regulators and rating agencies to reappraise 
appropriate levels and forms of capital. Australian 
banks responded by issuing considerable amounts 
of new equity – the highest quality form of   
capital – while changes to the growth and 
composition of their loan portfolios limited 
increases in their risk-weighted assets. Unlike banks 
in a number of other countries, at no point was 
there any injection of public money into Australian 
bank capital. 
National and international regulatory bodies have 
proposed major changes to capital regulations, 
which include: increasing the quality, consistency 
and transparency of the capital base; strengthening 
the risk coverage of the capital framework; 
implementing a leverage ratio; and introducing 
countercyclical capital requirements. The details of 
the new global capital standards will be finalised, 
along with other reforms, later in the year.    
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